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Capitalism has become the dominant form of  economic organisation across most of 
the planet. Although its ultimate supremacy looked far from assured during some 
parts of the twentieth century, at the beginning of the twenty-first, the principal focus 
of attention for policy-makers and scholars alike has become not whether nations will 
become capitalist, but what type of capitalist economies they will develop. In the 
aftermath of the Cold War, as economic, rather than strategic rivalry has become a 
more immediate source of international competition (Luttwak 1990), it has become 
increasingly clear that there are a number of important variations on the overall theme 
of capitalist development. Much of the unfolding and increasingly sophisticated 
debate about ‘models’ of capitalism that has emerged as a consequence, has 
concentrated on the distinctive national qualities that capitalism has assumed in 
different parts of the world, differences that are often taken to confer specific 
competitive advantages as a consequence (Porter 1990; Hall 1999; Soskice 1999).  
 
Important though such insights are, the contemporary literature in this burgeoning 
field has tended to concentrate on the established industrialised economies of Western 
Europe, North America and Japan; less attention has been given to countries outside 
this ‘core’. This focus on the experience of the developed world has reinforced what 
we describe as a ‘voluntaristic bias’ in understandings of contemporary capitalism and 
the fate of nations.  This is a perspective which privileges the role of agency, 
particularly the self-made efforts of  individual nation-states to integrate effectively 
into an increasingly global capitalist economy.  We argue that this approach obscures 
the structural and institutional forces that potentially constrain the development of 
countries, especially those outside the core. Too often, the assumption is that 
successful capitalist development is ultimately a question of adopting a technically 
optimal set of policies, and that a lack of development is attributable to domestic 
policy failures and institutional inadequacies.  
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The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first section presents an overview of 
the distinctive qualities of capitalism itself, briefly outlining its historical development 
and its central dynamics, and considering the debate about national models of 
capitalism. Yet important as this literature is, unless it can account for ‘models’ of 
capitalism in Africa, Latin America and Asia, and explain the forces that have shaped 
their distinctive national economic outcomes, then it will remain of limited utility. 
What is often missing from such nationally-focused analyses is a consideration of the 
structures and institutions that influence capitalist development at the international as 
well as the domestic level.  Developing countries and those nations in transition from 
centrally-planned to market-based economic orders must seek to integrate with a pre-
existing international economic order dominated by the developed economies and 
supported by a powerful array of influential international institutions which 
effectively set the regulatory framework with which developing countries must 
comply – often on highly unfavourable terms. These institutions - which effectively 
create or entrench the structured relations that shape economic outcomes across the 
globe – must be part of any explanation of contemporary capitalism and the fate of 
nations. Consequently, the second section looks in more detail at the theoretical and 
policy  implications of the international expansion of capitalism. The final section 
considers the implications of this analysis for capitalist development more generally. 
Before this, however, we provide a brief overview of the argument and conceptual 
framework we employ. 
 
The Evolution of Capitalism Within Nations 
 
In this section we highlight a number of the essential qualities of capitalism that not 
only continue to distinguish it from alternative modes of economic organisation, but 
which have become ubiquitous features of an increasingly transnational system that 
has been consolidated in  areas of the world outside of the core in which capitalism 
originated. The key ponit to emphasise here is that capitalism’s original class-based 
character, and its eventual expansion throughout the world has consolidated powerful 
and constraining structures and institutions that have advantaged some nations while 
constraining others.  
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The development of capitalist social relations 
 
In the four or five hundred years since its original development in Great Britain to its 
contemporary status as the first global system of economic organisation, capitalism 
has changed greatly over time and space.  Despite this evolution, however, there are a 
number of key continuities that define capitalism and which must be present  for any 
economic system to be considered capitalist, of which the following are crucial: 
profit-driven, market-oriented commodity production; private ownership of the means 
of production; the dominance of wage labour; and individualistic, acquisitive 
behaviour (Hunt 1979).1 There is nothing natural or inevitable about any of these 
features, and indeed, for most of human history very different patterns of economic 
organisation have predominated. Indeed, as Polanyi (1957: 140) pointed out, ‘the road 
to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, 
centrally organised and controlled interventionism’. In other words, market-based 
capitalist systems have always been dependent upon states to actively create and 
maintain the conditions that allow their continued existence – without such support 
and state-sponsored regulation, capitalism could not exist (Heilbroner 1985). 
 
One of the key reasons that capitalism requires the regulatory support of states with 
the capacity, if required, to enforce a particular political or social order, is that 
capitalism is a class-based society.  For social theorists drawing on a ‘radical’ or 
Marxian tradition, the existence of class structured societies and the concomitant 
dynamic of class conflict is a central component of capitalism. Class differentiation is 
a consequence of the fact that under capitalism the ‘means of production’ – land, 
capital, factories, technology, etc – are privately owned. As a consequence, one class 
of people - the proletariat - has to sell its labour to the other - the capitalists or 
bourgeoisie. This structured demarcation helps explain both capitalism’s  dynamism 
and what Marxists take to be its ultimately unsustainable nature. On the one hand, the 
appropriation by capitalists of the surplus value2 created by the ‘free’ labour they 
employ is the central mechanism of ‘capital accumulation’ and the re-investment in 
productive activities that is so central to capitalist expansion. On the other hand, 
however, human beings find themselves in an entirely novel, market-based 
relationship with each other; labour itself had become a commodity (Giddens (1985).  
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Although class issues have in some ways become less prominent in the developed 
world, at least as a component in the active creation of self-identity (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985), in the developing world, the picture is more complex. While class 
issues are frequently important parts of social mobilisation where processes of 
industrialisation and urbanisation have occurred (Rueschemeyer et al 1992), it is also 
important to note that in much of the developing world the penetration of capitalist 
social relations is mixed with more traditional forms of economic relations. At the 
level of what Braudel (1992: 28) described as ‘material civilisation’, or the perennial, 
predominantly rural patterns of existence that continue to characterise the bulk of 
humankind’s lived experience, the penetration of market forces and the development 
of capitalist social relations is in some respects still relatively embryonic.3 
 
At the level of transnational structures that continue to shape the system in which 
material civilisation is realised, however, Europe has played a crucial historical role. 
Not only did capitalism have its origins in Western Europe, but this mode of 
economic organisation and Europe’s other great invention – the sovereign state – were 
subsequently exported to, or imposed upon, the rest of the world (Buzan and Little 
2000). One of the reasons that capitalism emerged in Western Europe during the 
Middle Ages, it is argued, is that specific institutions were developed which 
encouraged capitalistic economic behaviour (North and Thomas 1973; Weber 1974). 
Crucial here were the development of property rights and monetary systems which 
secured the position of the emergent capitalist class and encouraged the growth of 
trade between expanding mediaeval towns. Whatever the merits of this sort of 
functionalist reasoning, however, it is difficult to transpose this model easily to other 
places and times where very different circumstances have prevailed.  
 
The very fact that capitalism had already become dominant in Europe meant that 
countries that followed in its wake faced a different array of constraints and 
opportunities. Not only did the economies of the core enjoy significant ‘first mover’4 
advantages in securing a lucrative and strategically important presence in key 
industries, but they were able to use their enhanced political influence to create an 
international regulatory structure that protected their interests. We shall examine this 
latter development in more detail later, the point to emphasise here, however, is that 
the economic and political dominance of the core has meant that all subsequent 
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debates about the nature of capitalism and its historical position have tended to be 
refracted through European lenses. 
 
There are a couple of important points to be made about this. First, as Frank (1998) 
has argued, this Eurocentrism has obscured the fact that there were important centres 
of economic activity in existence outside of Europe before the European states and 
capitalists began their outward expansion. Indeed, for much of recorded history, 
Europe was a marginal player in trade relations between parts of Asia, Africa, and the 
Middle East. Despite this, however, the primary focus of analytical attention by 
scholars attempting to understand the evolution of an increasingly international 
economic system has been Europe and ‘the rise of the West’.5 Second, as Arif Dirlik 
points out, this preoccupation with the European exemplar, and the tendency to 
measure other parts of the world in terms of their ability to replicate the European 
model, has distorted the way developmental processes have been understood and 
caused many to lose sight of the fact that ‘the narrative of capitalism is no longer a 
narrative of the history of Europe’ (Dirlik 1999: 318). 
 
The expansion and consolidation of capitalism 
 
Capitalism is driven by the endless pursuit of new sources of growth and profit.  At an 
individual level this may be attributed to acquisitiveness.  In a modern institutional 
context, however,  the expansive drive of capitalism has been reinforced by the 
dynamics of corporate competition and the need to maximise share-holder value. As 
Heilbroner (1985: 142) observes, ‘the paths of capitalist nations by no means run on 
parallel tracks; and yet in all variations, the trajectory of capitalism is immediately 
recognisable as a movement guided by the imperious need for profit’. Despite this 
ubiquitous imperative, and the current preoccupation with ‘globalisation’,6 capitalism 
has nevertheless evolved in nationally specific ways. In order to more fully 
comprehend such contingent differences, it is necessary to sketch briefly some of the 
more important changes that occurred in the evolution of capitalism over the course of 
the twentieth century. Of greatest significance here has been a secular shift from an 
international economic system predicated on trade to one that is increasingly 
dominated by strategies of transnational production, and a growing separation 
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between the ‘real’ economy of goods and services production, and the ‘money’ 
economy dominated by an increasingly powerful financial sector. 
 
In the nineteenth century, as Hoogvelt  (1997) points out, world trade grew 11 times 
more quickly than world production. Moreover, world trade was just that – Africa, 
Asia, and South America were all major players in an international trading system. 
Indeed, the ‘Third World’ accounted for 50 per cent of world trade in 1913, compared 
to only 22 per cent today (Hoogvelt 19997: 14). One of the central causes of this 
dramatic expansion in trade was imperialism, the political expression of Europe’s 
outward economic expansion. Although there is a good deal of debate about the 
causes and consequences imperialism, it is important to recognise that capitalism has 
historically been  subject to cyclical booms and busts7 - colonialism offered one way 
of resolving European difficulties through outward expansion and exploitation  
(Hobsbawm 1987: 45). New markets, raw materials, and cheap labour offered a way 
of maintaining profitability and the fundamental process of capital accumulation and 
re-investment that is so fundamental to capitalism if it is to flourish.  
 
In the twentieth century this picture of predominantly European exploitation of 
colonial empires changed profoundly, as both the structure of international economic 
activity altered and as new centres of power emerged. One of the most important 
long-term developments has been the emergence of transnational corporations (TNCs) 
that dominate and organise international economic activities (Dicken 1992). Trade is 
increasingly intra-industry,  something that happens within TNCs, and which is 
overwhelmingly destined for the markets of the developed economies. The emergence 
of a  ‘new international division of labour’, (Frobel et al 1978),8 in which TNCs 
actively sought to take advantage of a global labour force and foreign factors of 
production may have reinforced the structural power of mobile capital over immobile 
labour, but it also allowed a number of countries to accelerate the industrialisation 
process and develop successful export industries. For example, the success enjoyed by 
a number of East Asian countries, the region’s general openness to the increased 
flows of foreign investment associated with the new production strategies, and its 
general  export orientation seemed to stand in stark contrast with the experiences of 
Africa or Latin South American. In the latter case, policies of import substitution and 
greater self-reliance did not generate similar results (Ellison and Gereffi 1990). Even 
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following greater trade and financial liberalisation during the 1990s, Latin American 
countries failed to replicate the East Asia experience (Phillips ??). 
 
The other crucial development in the structure of the contemporary global economy 
that merits mention is the rise of financial capital. In the last two decades, financial 
capital has become prominent, if not dominant, primarily because the United States 
unilaterally abandoned the system of regulation and managed exchange rates that had 
underpinned the Bretton Woods  system for the first few of decades after World War 
II. Although a detailed  discussion of this period is beyond the scope of this chapter,9 
a couple of points are worth emphasising. Despite the obvious role of agency in the 
transformation of the Bretton Woods institutions, the net effect of this period, which 
led to the exponential growth of financial markets and flows of mobile capital, has 
been to make financial capital a more central ‘structural’ component of the 
contemporary international system (Helleiner 1994; Andrews 1994).  As the recent 
East Asian crisis vividly demonstrated, for smaller developing economies, large scale, 
highly mobile flows of financial capital can have profound effects on individual 
nations and severely constrain the options available to national policymakers (Winters 
2000). Importantly, the growing structural power of the financial sector  has 
underpinned the creation of a ‘rentiers regime’, in which ‘the values of finance capital 
have won precedence over all others’ (Greider 1997: 296). As a consequence, the 
removal of impediments to financial flows, and the achievement of monetary stability 
and low inflation - generally achieved through initial doses of high interest rates – 
take precedence over other policy alternatives, including expansionary programs to 
boost employment or promote industrial development. Put differently, the interests of 
financial capital become structurally embedded parts of the international financial and 
wider economic architecture. 
 
The other issue that the rise of financial capital illustrates is just how influential a 
number of key actors have become in setting the ‘rules of the game’ within which all 
national economies are embedded.10 The role of the original Bretton Woods 
institutions -  the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) - has changed over time, but they, along with the US,11 remain  key actors in 
the management of the international system (Eichengreen and  Kenen 1994). The 
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post-war institutional architecture is a product of American hegemony and reflects a 
desire to create a particular  liberal world order, one that reflected the normative 
judgements of predominantly American policymakers about the most appropriate 
course and content of economic activity in the international system. As such, the 
system was designed to further America’s larger economic and strategic interests 
(Panitch 2000; Beeson and Capling forthcoming). Significantly, the normative and 
economic vision that underpins this liberal perspective has been championed by the 
very same institutions that have emerged to manage the increasingly interdependent 
intentional system (Cox 1987). In the longer term the net effect of this order has been 
to promote the interests of an increasingly internationalised business class and to 
consolidate the authority of a range of  inter-governmental and non- state actors 
(Strange 1990; Cutler et al 1999). It is also important to note, however, that the post-
war order that emerged under US hegemony also permitted the development of 
relatively disitinctive national capitalisms. 
 
National capitalisms 
 
Within what Ruggie (1982) famously described as a system of ‘embedded liberalism’, 
individual nations were incorporated into a broadly liberal international order that 
simultaneously allowed a significant degree of domestic economic autonomy and 
internal protection. It is important to remember that the early phase of American 
hegemony was marked by a relentless, Manichean struggle with communism 
generally and  the Soviet Union in particular, to which all other issues were 
subordinate (Cronin 1996). In such circumstances, American allies were given 
significant latitude in questions of economic management: even illiberal or state-
dominated capitalism was better than no capitalism at all. This environment, in which 
economic development occurred within increasingly connected, though still 
comparatively insulated domestic spheres, fostered the distinctive forms of national 
capitalisms that have been at the centre of much contemporary theorisation. Our 
contention is that such nationally-based analyses need to be explicitly linked to the 
larger geo-political structures that constitute the liberal post-wast war international 
order that American hegemony effectively created (Latham 1997). Simply put, we 
need to develop a theoretical perspective that can account for the way capitalism has 
differentially developed in both core economies like the U.S, Germany and Japan, as 
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well as ‘peripheral’ economies like Korea or Chile. With such caveats in mind, there 
is a good deal that is useful to be learnt from the study of ‘national models of 
capitalism’. 
 
One of the most influential approaches to the study of ‘competing capitalisms’ 
(Beeson 1999), has emerged from comparative institutional analysis. A central insight 
of this literature is that the existing array of institutions in any social context places 
limits on the mode of economic governance that can emerge or predominate by 
providing the ‘rules of the game of human interaction’ (North 1990: 384). Although 
there is a good deal of debate about the role and nature of institutions in a variety of 
political science, economic, historical and especially sociological literatures, there is 
general agreement that they are socially constituted arrangements that endure over 
time, which play a crucial role as bearers of embedded rules, norms and enforcement 
practices in regulating social behaviour (see Beeson 2002; Bell 2001). Significantly, 
although institutions are created by human action, once established they also shape it. 
People know how to behave in particular social situations because they have learned 
the ‘rules’ and appropriate behaviours that govern or constitute such activities (Searle 
1995: 27). This is important because the precise form institutions take in any location 
will not only help to shape patterns of day-to-day behaviour, but will impart a degree 
of ‘path dependency’ to social action (Mahoney 2000). Contemporary and future 
social outcomes are, to a significant degree, conditioned by the actions of the past. 
This is an especially important consideration when we remember that the complex 
pattern of inter-related phenomena we label ‘capitalism’, is, first and foremost, an 
institutionalised expression of a social relationship. As a consequence, institutional 
differences and the embedded norms they represent help to account for some of the 
important and enduring differences between national systems of economic 
organisation (Zysman 1994). 
 
There are a number of possible forms such coordination may take at the national 
level, with concomitantly different emphases on the importance of market forces, 
social obligations or the role of the state (Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997: 11). In the 
so-called ‘Anglo-American’ economies – the US, Britain, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand – much greater emphasis is placed on the role of the market as the key form 
of governance determining the production and allocation of goods and services. In a 
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number of the countries of East Asia, by contrast, social obligations and complex 
networks of societal and state-centred relationships may be more important influences 
on individual behaviour than markets or self-interest. Likewise, the more inclusive or 
‘corporatist’12 political structures that have characterised a number of European social 
democracies represent a distinctive way of responding to the challenges of global 
economic integration that diverges from the neoliberal or Anglo-American orthodoxy 
(see Katzenstein 1985; Grote and Schmitter 1999). Indeed, it is important to 
emphasise that different institutional settings may cause the very definition of self-
interest and even ‘economic efficiency’ to vary from context to context, placing major 
constraints on the type of activities and economic structures that are likely to emerge 
as a consequence (see Granovetter,1992;  Orrù et al 1991). 
 
One way of conceptualising these national and regional variations on the general 
theme of capitalist organisation is by considering them as what Hollingsworth and 
Boyer (1997: 2) call ‘social systems of production’. This formulation offers a broad 
comparative framework within which to consider what distinguishes political and 
economic activity in different areas. Of greatest significance, Hollingsworth and 
Boyer contend, are institutional features like the industrial relations systems, 
corporate organisation, the financial sector, the state and state policies, and the 
overarching value system that institutions embody. In a similar manner, David 
Soskice (1999) argues that ‘production regimes’ are ways of conceptualising the 
organisation of production through markets and market-related institutions. 
Production regimes are institutional frameworks of financial, industrial, educational 
and corporate systems that may be divided into ‘business-coordinated market 
economies’ (like Germany and Japan), and ‘uncoordinated or liberal market 
economies’ (the Anglo-American economies). Despite the fact that Soskice’s analysis 
remains centred on the major industrialised economies, there are a number of 
important insights that emerge from this sort of work that have wider ramifications 
and which can help illuminate the position of other areas. 
 
One of the most important differences between capitalism in Japan, Germany and 
America has been the role played by their respective financial sectors. Historically, 
the US has had capital markets that operate largely independently of government 
intervention, something that has tended to reinforce the distance between government 
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and industry more generally. In Japan, the government has traditionally dominated the 
allocation of credit to indigenous companies through powerful agencies like the 
Ministry of Finance. In Germany, by contrast, domestic financial institutions 
dominate the provision and allocation of credit and reinforce their power by holding 
substantial stock in German corporations (Zysman 1983). However, in an era when 
the growth and integration of capital markets has made the idea of discrete national 
economic spaces less tenable, both Japan and Germany are facing challenges to their 
distinctive systems. In Japan the gradual liberalisation of the domestic financial 
system has opened up new opportunities for domestic firms, simultaneously 
diminishing the influence of the Japanese government and undermining the integrity 
of Japan’s corporate system (Calder 1997). In Germany, too, the link between 
domestic financial institutions, a distinctively national form of capitalism, and a 
concomitant social accommodation is not as robust as it once was (Streek  1997: 252). 
The significance of such developments is that even the most powerful core countries 
are being constrained by changes in the structures of the global economic system in 
general and by finance capital in particular. 
 
And yet, this sort of nationally-focused analysis servers as a powerful reminder that at 
the domestic or societal level, even in Western Europe, important variations on the 
theme of capitalist organisation endure. Epsing-Anderson’s (1990) seminal 
examination of Europe’s welfare states reminds us that even within regions and 
countries with seemingly similar historical backgrounds and levels of economic 
development, differences in class relations and political alignments have a major 
influence on the sort of social accommodations that are reached, even where the 
institutional form appears superficially similar. The limitation of this sort of analysis 
as far as the non-core countries is concerned is that even where broadly comparable 
institutional structures exist, these sorts of Eurocentric institutional templates may not 
capture the different form institutions take in other parts of the world or the different 
purposes to which they may be put. Not only are social security systems, for example, 
generally much less developed outside of Europe and North America, but even where 
they do exist they may be controlled and organised in ways that consolidate non-
democratic practises.13 Despite the insights generated by the general institutionally-
based approach, therefore, there are limits to how easily the European experience or 
conceptual framework can be transferred to other parts of the world. It is for this 
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reason that a wider structurally-based analysis is necessary to capture and account for 
the experiences of countries outside the core. 
 
International Capitalism and Its Implications 
 
The contemporary international political-economy is a paradoxical place. On the one 
hand, there is an intensification of processes associated with globalisation, which 
some observers claim is undermining the power of states and creating an increasingly 
integrated and global economic order (Strange 1996; Ohmae 1996). On the other 
hand, the simultaneous persistence of national models of capitalism leads others to 
argue that such claims are seriously overstated (Wade 1996; Weiss 1998; Garrett 
1998). How, then, are we to understand the forces that are determining the structure of  
the international economy, especially as they affect the diversity of national capitalist 
experiences outside the core, developed economies? More tangibly, are such 
structures facilitating or constraining development in the non-core countries? 
 
Theorising economic development 
 
At the outset, it should be recognised that there is much at stake in discussions of 
economic development, and not just for the potential beneficiaries of increased 
growth rates or rising living standards. During the Cold War period in particular, 
debates about development were overlaid by the explicit or implicit normative 
concerns that flowed from intense ideological contestation between the super-powers. 
It also needs to be remembered that for the first few decades of the Cold War, the 
Soviet Union and its distinctive brand of central planning was not simply a formidable 
strategic rival, but actually appeared as a plausible development alternative. In such 
circumstances, influential political scientists in the West argued that the establishment 
of political order should take priority over political emancipation in establishing the 
preconditions for development (Huntington 1968). What is especially noteworthy, 
however, is that even in the less ideologically charged post-Cold War environment, 
critics of the dominant development discourses that emanate from powerful agencies 
like the World Bank and the IMF claim that there is a desire to manage the 
increasingly interdependent global economy according to a particular set of criteria 
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that reflect dominant ‘Western’  ideas about economics and the appropriate path to 
successful capitalist development (Cooper and Packard 1997; Gordon 1994). 
 
At the centre of the liberal economic paradigm that has underpinned such influential 
discourses has been the Ricardian notion of ‘comparative advantage’, or the idea that 
countries should do what they are ‘naturally’ best at. Countries with large populations 
should develop labour intensive industries, countries with abundant resources should 
exploit them, and so forth. Yet critics point out that not only does such thinking 
threaten to lock developing countries into less valuable economic activities 
permanently and entrench the structural dominance of the developed world, but it is 
unable to account for the remarkable success of countries like Japan, which had no 
obvious comparative advantage in a range of sophisticated manufacturing industries 
until government-business cooperation actually created one (see Tabb 1995). Indeed, 
the success of Japan and its acolytes in East Asia drew attention to the fact that at 
least some states had the capacity to develop and continuously upgrade a more 
dynamic form of competitive advantage that was a central determinant of how 
nationally-based economic activities were integrated into the wider international 
system (Wade 1990; Bell 1995). In an increasingly integrated global economy, 
activist industry policies had more chance of developing domestic industries to 
exploit lucrative niches, or of attracting relatively footloose forms of investment to 
accelerate the industrialisation process. 
 
Japan’s ‘developmental state’, which was emulated with varying degrees of success 
across much of Northeast Asia, demonstrated that not only was it apparently possible 
to rise up the international division of labour, but that states could – perhaps always 
had14 – play a crucial role in determining just what that position would be. Japan’s 
pioneering success, and later that of Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore, also 
highlighted the fact that timing is crucial. Not only did Japan in particular exploit the 
advantages that accrue to ‘late’ developers able to utilise existing technologies (see 
Gerschenkron 1966), but they were also able to take advantage of both a secular surge 
in global economic activity and the particularly favourable geo-strategic environment 
the Cold War provided; there were expanding markets for East Asian goods in the 
1960s and ’70s, and the US was prepared to tolerate authoritarian mercantilism and 
domestic protection because of its overarching strategic concerns. For the countries of 
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Southeast Asia that attempted to replicate this experience in the 1970s and ’80s, and 
for the transition economies of Eastern Europe more recently, this benign 
environment no longer exists. Not only is it proving more difficult to break into 
industries that are already highly competitive and dominated by the established 
developed economies (Kaplinsky 2000), but the IMF and the World Bank have 
displayed a willingness to exploit their strategic leverage to try and enforce market-, 
rather than state-centred development models on the likes of Indonesia and Russia 
(Beeson 1998; Lavigne 1995). 
 
Again, the theoretical implications of the East Asian experience in particular and the 
evolution of the post-war order more generally, are paradoxical and contradictory, but 
a number of points can be made. First, the simple bifurcation made in some variants 
of world systems theory between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’, in which the developed 
industrial economies of Europe, and latterly North America and Japan, systematically 
exploited the underdeveloped economies of Asia, South America and Africa 
(Wallerstein 1979), appears unable to account for East Asia’s rise. For some 
countries, at least, the structure of the global economy has proved more porous and 
accommodating than the rather static, undifferentiated core-periphery model implies. 
And yet, the recent crisis has revealed just how fragile, partial and ultimately 
dependent was the position of the Southeast Asian region in particular. This implies a 
second major point: one of the major failings in analysis of the Asian region has been 
the frequent failure to distinguish between the earlier industrialising  states of 
Northeast Asia with their generally competent bureaucracies, and the states of 
Southeast Asia, which faced greater developmental challenges and generally had 
fewer resources to meet them.  Revealingly, much of the ‘dependency’ literature that 
emerged to account for Latin America’s development failures in the 1960s (see 
(Roxbourough 1979), still resonates powerfully with some of the Southeast Asian 
region’s most prominent activists and theorists (see Hewison 2001). Indeed, it is 
precisely this sort of analysis, and the desire to overcome enduring structural and 
institutional constraints, that has led countries like Malaysia to pursue greater 
economic autonomy in order to try and promote economic development (see Beeson 
2000). 
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Given the impact of recent financial crises in Russia, Asia and Latin America,15 the 
renewed concern with possible regional dependency becomes more comprehensible. 
Moments of crisis have the effect of highlighting the structured and interconnected 
nature of the global economy and revealing the most powerful actors within it. In this 
regard, it became even more apparent how vulnerable regions outside the core are to 
the whims of investment fund managers and possible rapid withdrawals of capital. It 
also became apparent that states operating in tandem with international institutions 
continued to play a crucial role in actually facilitating such process, as Panitch (2000: 
14-15) points out: 
 
…the process of globalisation, far from dwarfing states, has been constituted 
through and even by them. The removal of cross-border flows, the ‘Big Bang’ 
which broke down internal barriers within financial markets, massive 
privatisation of public assets and deregulation in other spheres – all this was 
accomplished through state action, requiring legalization and juridification of 
new relations among economic agents in both domestic and international arenas. 
 
The key point to emphasise here, therefore, is that not only are there an array of newly 
powerful actors in the global economy, like TNCs and the controllers of mobile 
financial assets, but their position is reinforced by the actions of states and 
international institutions actively enforcing the existent rules of the game. This does 
not mean that there is simple and unproblematic correlation between ‘US hegemony’ 
and the promotion of the interests of  ‘American’ capital, however. On the contrary, 
there have been a number of occasions when the US-based financial  interests have 
clashed with those of America’s public policy makers.16 Indeed, even during the 
recent Asian financial crisis there was a noteworthy split between the position of the 
Treasury Department bent on transforming existent Asian economic systems, and that 
of the Defence Department, concerned about the strategic implications that might 
flow from the destabilisation of Southeast Asia.17  
 
The most useful way of conceptualising the structural dominance of financial interests 
in particular and the interests that support it, is by recognising that as capitalism has 
become a global system, the social relationships associated with it have also become 
transnationalised. Robert Cox (1987: 359) suggests that a ‘transnational managerial 
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class’ has emerged which, operating through powerful international institutions like 
the World Bank and the IMF, has attempted to create a world order that reflects its 
perceived interests. From a Marxist perspective, globalisation is creating both a 
transnational capitalist class and a ‘transnational state’ that is driven by the logic of 
global rather than national capital accumulation (Robinson and Harris 2000: 40). In 
short, the powerful actors that effectively shape the governance mechanisms of the 
international system are embedded within a wider array of rules, institutions and 
relationships of power that help constitute the structures of global capitalism; 
structures that continue to exert a constraining influence on developing or transitional 
economies in particular. 
 
Thus, in contrast to those (mainly liberal) theoretical perspectives that account for the 
level of economic development within an exclusively national framework (eg. Olson 
1982), we are suggesting that if we wish to understand the relative failure of parts of 
Southeast Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe to either accelerate or consolidate 
their developmental projects, we need to recognise the importance of the structural 
constraints they confront in an international system dominated by powerful external 
actors. This is not to suggest that distinctive national political practices and economic 
structures are no longer  significant determinants of economic outcomes across 
regions and nations. On the contrary, they are. But we have to acknowledge that such 
models are under pressure and not as distinctive as they once were, even within the 
established industrial powers that have a greater capacity to support them. In much of 
the developing world, therefore, the difficulty of breaking into an established global 
production hierarchy in which the rules of international engagement are defined, 
largely to the advantage of the major, established players, and in which dirigiste 
policies are actively discouraged, helps to explain the continuing difficulties many of 
these countries experience.  
 
Globalising IPE: Structure, agency and development 
 
The key challenge that emerges from the foregoing analysis is to develop a theoretical 
framework that takes the structures and institutions of the international political 
economy seriously, while simultaneously recognising the importance of contingent 
factors at the national and regional levels, and even at the level of the production 
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process itself. In this section we provide the outline of such an approach, and link it to  
a number of important debates that have emerged at the intersection of the IPE and 
development studies literatures. We suggest that although states are clearly central 
parts of the evolving international system, those outside the core face an array of 
constraints that are simply not captured by much of the comparative literature centred 
on the experience of the core economies. 
 
What emerges from an analysis of global capitalism’s development, therefore,  is the 
need  for a theoretical approach that can effectively integrate agency, institutions and 
structures. In this context we find the approach developed by Robert Cox particularly 
useful.  Cox’s approach to contemporary international political economy is one that 
attempts to link structure (‘objective factors’) and agency (‘subjective factors’) via the 
mediating influence of institutions (Cox 1987: 29). Of even greater value for our 
purposes, was the fact that Cox (1987: 7) explicitly connected this schema to an 
overarching ‘world order’ centred on a particular hegemonic power (currently the 
United States). Following Cox, we shall attempt to account for the very different 
outcomes that have occurred within this increasingly global capitalist framework – 
outcomes which threaten to undermine the consensual nature of that hegemony 
precisely because development outside the core economies has been so problematic.  
 
Following Cox, then, we suggest that IPE theory that hopes to understand the 
complex dynamics and evolution of contemporary capitalism needs to be especially 
attentive to the interaction between agency, structure and institutions.  Of particular 
importance is the way in which countries operate within a structured and 
institutionalised terrain which shapes the way in which national economic spaces are 
integrated into the international political economy.  Simply put, agents or actors face 
different choices or constraints regarding the way they are incorporated into the 
existent international system. One of the crucial determining factors that influences 
how this interaction between the broadly conceived national and the international 
spheres will be played out, which will also shape the resulting models of capitalism, 
we argue, is the role of institutions. At one level, these may be the sort of ubiquitous 
transnational institutions established under the Bretton Woods agreement. At another 
level, however, they are the highly specific array of national institutions and 
capacities that ultimately determine how such external forces will be accommodated.  
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 For our purposes, structures may be defined as overarching systemic conditions in the 
international political economy. The structure of capital ownership, the structural 
power of highly mobile financial capital, or patterns of supply and demand in the 
world economy can all be thought of as systemic characteristics which condition 
outcomes and forms of behaviour.  For example, the relationship between, say, 
national economic structure and the pattern of supply and demand in the world 
economy, is a relationship which has proved increasingly disadvantageous to basics 
commodity exporters as they confront difficult trade conditions and continually 
declining terms of trade. But structural forces shape rather than wholly determine 
behaviour and outcomes, because agency and institutional factors will always mediate 
the impact of structures.  North (1990: 4) defines an institution as ‘any form of 
constraint that human beings devise to shape action’.  Institutions are essentially the 
formal and informal ‘rules of the game’, typically backed by sanctions of one kind or 
another.  There are also often feedback relationships between structures and 
institutions.  For example, the structural power of financial capital in the world 
economy is underpinned by the institutional rules of the financial markets game.   
 
The same general types of relationship pertain with respect to the institutions designed 
to govern arenas such as the protection of property rights, the terms and conditions of 
capital investment or the regulation of trade or protection. Hence, it is important to 
focus on the way such systemic forms or persistent patterns of behaviour become 
structurally and institutionally entrenched in the evolving capitalist system, and what 
implications this may have for models of capitalist development in the core and 
developing regions. Consequently, one of our major arguments is that the structure of 
the global trade, production and finance regimes, is actively reproduced by powerful 
inter-governmental agencies and institutions, and by increasingly transnational class 
structures that effectively set the ‘rules of the game’ in ways that systematically create 
patterns of advantage and disadvantage in the world economy.  
 
While we acknowledge that agency is an important determinant of state behaviour 
(Wendt 1999), and that national institutions can be important expressions and causes 
of differential national economic outcomes (Hollingsworth and Boyer 1998), we 
contend that unless we recognise the enduring impact of the existent structures and 
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institutions of the global economy it is not possible to account for the continuing 
development failures outside  the core economies. In order to develop a theory of IPE 
that can accommodate both structure and agency, theoretical eclecticism is essential. 
Two, generally discrete, bodies of scholarship used in combination offer a potentially 
useful way of conceptualising capitalist development across very different regions. 
On the one hand, it is important to emphasise the continuing importance of structural 
analysis and highlight a number of insights that are generally overlooked in the 
preoccupation with the distinct national economies of the core. On the other hand, 
however, we need to utilise institutional theory to illustrate how the impact of global 
structures is mediated or shaped by national and international institutions. Only by 
considering national institutions, and the wider array of institutions and structures in 
which national economies operate, can we hope to understand the constraints and 
opportunities that individual nations face. This approach offers a way of explaining 
the developmental challenges confronting the majority of the world’s population that 
lives outside the core, experiences that are often neglected in much contemporary 
international political economy scholarship. 
 
The contemporary international order 
 
Thus despite some ubiquitous and universal features, the expansion of international 
capitalism has assumed different forms in different places and been realised in very 
different historical circumstances. Significantly, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the 
capacity for influential actors and institutions to influence the evolution of the 
underlying structures of global capitalism has been enhanced. Hardly any part of the 
globe is now not part of, or seeking greater integration with, the overarching capitalist 
system. In such circumstances, overt ideological contestation has been replaced by the 
rhetoric of ‘good governance’ and an emphasis on technocratic competence. 
 
The disjuncture between the experiences of the core economies and the developing 
world is highlighted in the reformist agenda laid down by the World Bank and the 
IMF with US support. Epitomised by the good governance agenda, this highly 
influential discourse emphasises the importance of national agency rather than 
international structure, with the key assumption being that effective economic, 
political and social development is achievable through the state-sponsored 
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implementation of suitable regulatory frameworks and the inculcation of ‘appropriate’ 
values amongst target populations more generally (Williams 1999). As Leftwich 
(1994: 364) perceptively pointed out nearly a decade ago, the good governance 
agenda is predicated on the assumption that ‘there is always an administrative “fix” in 
the normally difficult affairs of human society’. More recently, it has been argued that 
even if the requisite degree of enthusiasm for this sort of neoliberal reform agenda 
actually existed throughout the developing world, it is not clear that such reforms 
could be implemented anyway, given existent institutional constraints (Beeson 2001). 
Despite the difficulty in realising the good governance agenda, and doubts growing 
about its efficacy in actually transforming the situation that confronts countries 
outside the core (Escobar 1995), this should not be taken to imply that the role of 
external agencies is necessarily diminished. On the contrary, China’s attempts to gain 
accession to the WTO by liberalising and opening up its domestic economy (Hongyi 
2001) highlights both how influential the US-dominated Bretton Woods institutions 
remain, how extensive the spread of capitalism has become, and the possible 
limitations of nationally-based modes of analysis. 
 
Although a detailed analysis of the developmental challenges confronting the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) is not possible here, nevertheless, China’s sheer size, its 
strategic importance, its position as the pivotal transition economy, and its potential 
role as a major global market, mean it can be used to highlight briefly a number of  
important issues. First, China, despite some noteworthy disagreements amongst its 
ruling elites about the benefits of globalisation and economic openness (Garrett 2001), 
is effectively signing up to join an established capitalist international order, the 
governing structures of which were created by the dominant capitalist countries. 
Second, the manner in which capitalism and capitalist social relations have developed 
in China is highly distinctive. An institutional focus – if sufficiently sensitised to 
significant contingent differences in the way broadly similar institutions are realised - 
can help us to understand how existing institutions can be transformed by processes 
associated with the expansion of global capitalism. X.L. Ding has demonstrated how 
members of China’s political and economic elite have engaged in a form of 
‘spontaneous privatisation’ as ostensibly PRC controlled companies expand off-shore. 
Importantly, the precise nature of China’s growing TNCs is unlike those depicted in 
the leading comparative capitalisms literature, being neither entirely centrally 
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planned, nor completely market directed (Ding 2000: 127). Third, and as a 
consequence of this distinctive developmental style, China’s experience reinforces the 
idea that a predominantly national focus is no longer appropriate or adequate to 
capture the complexity of what are increasingly regionally-based interactions, both 
within China itself and between it and its neighbours (Breslin 2000).18 The emergence 
of a ‘Greater China’ that includes both Hong Kong and Taiwan is not simply a 
function of the increasingly dense webs of economic relationships that underpin this 
essentially regional phenomenon, but is also shaped by a complex of often 
contradictory ‘nationalist and geo-economic discourses’ that seek to influence the 
direction of the region’s nascent institutionalisation (Sum 1999). Put differently, the 
evolution of capitalism in China reflects a contradictory amalgam of national, regional 
and transnational factors that range from the narrowly economic and immediate, to 
issues of long term, geo-political importance that will ultimately help determine the 
precise form capitalism takes in China.  
 
At a time when China has effectively given up its claim to represent a major socialist 
alternative to the capitalist model, and when it actively seeks to join the international 
economic system on terms dictated by the dominant capitalist powers, then the 
similarities between broadly capitalist systems would seem to be of far greater 
significance than comparatively minor variations on the dominant capitalist theme 
(Strange 1997). This is not to suggest that differences within national jurisdictions 
will disappear, or that a process of ‘convergence’ on some common, economically or 
socially optimal end-point will necessarily occur in the foreseeable future.19 What it 
may mean, however, is that if we wish to understand some of the changes that are 
occurring within nations and the forces that are shaping them, we may need to look 
both above and below the level of the nation state itself. As far as economic analysis 
is concerned, the most useful points of comparison may now be at the sectoral and 
spatial, rather than the national level. As the Chinese exemplar illustrates, not only do 
regions within and across national borders appear to be increasingly associated with 
particular forms of production, or what Ruigrok and van Tulder (1995) call ‘industrial 
complexes’,20 but a focus on the production processes itself, rather than on the 
particular national context in which it is realised, seems to provide a useful way of 
thinking about capitalist development processes that are less tied to specific locations. 
Gary Gereffi has demonstrated how ‘global commodity chains’ are now central 
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components in new forms of economic organisation that are driven by TNCs  
following a transnational production logic; one that has more to do with the demands 
of global consumer markets and changes to more ‘flexible’21 modes of production 
than it does with any strictly national considerations. In  the super-competitive 
electronics industries based in East Asia, for example, a process of ‘mutual 
convergence or hybridization’ appears to be occurring, in which the Japanese and 
American firms that dominate production  are learning from each other as they 
reconfigure their regionally-based operations (Ernst and Ravenhill 2000: 244).  Even 
in the seemingly less constrained and intangible financial sector, ‘global cities’ have 
become the major nodes of activity, giving them a global rather than a national 
orientation (Sassen 1991). 
 
In an international system dominated by the twin forces of relatively mobile economic 
power in the form of TNCs and finance capital on the one hand, and an increasingly 
powerful array of transnational inter-governmental and private sector organisations 
underpinned by US hegemony on the other,  integration into the global capitalist 
system on relatively favourable terms depends to a significant degree on the sort of 
first mover advantages noted above. Those countries that industrialised early and 
established a dominant position in the global economic and political hierarchy enjoy 
enduring structurally entrenched advantages that are reinforced by a powerful 
transnational regulatory framework. Even the first wave of successful ‘late’ 
developing countries in East Asia were able to take advantage of fortuitous 
combination of economic and strategic structural conditions that no longer exist. And 
yet, the East Asian developmental experience was no fluke of history. Whatever 
problems the region may be currently experiencing, its remarkable success 
demonstrates that effective state capacity in combination with an accommodating 
configuration of external political, strategic and economic circumstances may make a 
profound difference in shaping domestic economic activity and determining the way 
such activities will be integrated with the wider international economy. The 
significance of national models of capitalism, therefore, is not just as idiosyncratic 
variations on a dominant theme, but in their capacity to manage the process of 
integrating with the international political economy.  
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Concluding remarks 
 
Capitalism is the dominant and ubiquitous mode of economic organisation throughout 
the world, but it is realised differently in different circumstances. Although recent 
literature concerned with the analysis of national models of capitalism has served to 
highlight this important characteristic of contemporary capitalism, scholarly attention 
has remained preoccupied with the experience of the developed economies that 
industrialised comparatively early in the development of what is an increasingly 
global and interconnected economic system. We have argued that such analyses  have 
often underplayed the role of structures and consequently can tell us little about the 
very different circumstances that confront developing countries attempting to 
integrate with global capitalism at a later stage. Most fundamentally, we suggest, the 
very existence and dominance of the established industrial powers, especially when 
combined with the array of international institutions and rules of the game they have 
constructed to help manage this system, mean that the ‘late’ developers of Asia, Latin 
America and Africa face structural constraints that not only restrict their ability to 
follow the earlier European, American and Japanese exemplars, but which are not 
captured at a theoretical level by analyses that remain preoccupied with the 
experience of the developed world. 
 
To address this theoretical lacunae we argued that it is necessary to draw on a number 
of what are generally disconnected bodies of literature. Crucially, we need to bring 
structures and institutional factors back into the analysis of global capitalism and 
recognise that its enduring features are systematically reproduced in ways that 
powerfully constrain those countries that are less able to influence its development. 
This is not to dismiss the importance of agency in accounting for the fate of nations 
and their place in the global economic hierarchy. Clearly, some policies are better 
than others and ‘good’ governance is better than bad – even if such definitions are 
inevitably as much normative as they are technical. Likewise, the array of national 
institutions to which scholars of national models of capitalism rightly draw attention 
will also affect economic outcomes; whatever globalisation is taken to be, it is plainly 
mediated by nationally demarcated political, social and economic realities. And yet, it 
is also vital to recognise that international economic competition is not played out on 
the proverbial ‘level playing field’ in which outcomes are determined by the efforts or 
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ingenuity of the competitors. The developing world doesn’t choose to be 
impoverished or at the bottom of a global order dominated by the first movers in 
capitalism’s inexorable expansion. Unless the structural and institutional factors that 
limit their development are recognised theoretically and addressed politically, things 
are unlikely to change. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Endnotes 
 
1 This is a formulation that draws primarily on Marxist scholarship. Followers of Max Weber would 
also stress the importance of a distinctively modern form of legally enshrined and calculable  
rationality in the development and operation of capitalism For an important comparison of Weber’s 
and Mark’s understandings of capitalism, see Sayer (1991). 
2 For Marx, the pursuit of ever greater amounts of surplus value was the key to capitalist dynamism. In 
essence, value is created through human labour in the production of commodities. Surplus value is the 
increased value that commodities acquire through the application of human labour which the capitalist 
then appropriates 
3 Thanks to Arif Dirlik for highlighting the significance of this point. 
4 This term was used by Alfred Chandler (1990)  to describe the benefits that accrued to companies that 
were first to secure positions in emerging industries. Given that ‘national economies’ are, in large part, 
an expression of the collective, privately organised corporate activity that occurs in a particular 
country, such an idea can be usefully applied to this earlier period of less internationally integrated 
industrialisation. 
5 See, for example,  North and Thomas (1973); Hall (1985) 
6 Globalisation is a notoriously imprecise concept, but for our purposes here it will be used as a short-
hand referent for the transnational increase in and integration of trade, investment, financial flows, and 
the domestic and international political arrangements that seek to facilitate them. For an overview of 
the issues, see Held et al (1999). 
7 Capitalism displays important long-term and short-term cyclical qualities that have major impacts on 
both the prevailing economic and political orders. See Goldstein (1988). 
8 It should be noted that this formulation is somewhat dated now and that the contemporary 
international division of labour is a much more complex affair and shaped by a range of competitive 
factors including, technology, infrastructure, labour force qualities and government policies. See 
Ruigrok and van Tulder, (1995) .  
9 But for a good discussion see Block (1977). 
10 As similar point can be made about the rise of the so-called ‘knowledge economy’, and the manner 
in which the US government and American corporations in particular have moved to create a regime 
that protects increasingly important and luctarive intenllectual property. See Sell (2000); Braithwaite 
and Drahos (2000). 
11 It is important to emphasise that just how much influence the US continues to exert over the running 
of the international financial system. As Arrighi (1994: 278) observes, although the IMF and World 
Bank have in principle responsibility for global economic management, in practice the US Federal 
Reserve System acting in concert with the central banks of key allies exerts a crucial influence that 
helps consolidate a wider strategic architecture. 
12 In Schmitter’s (1979: 22) formulation ‘societal corporatism’ is distinguished by competitive electoral 
processes, ideologically varied executive authorities, and is associated with ‘postliberal, advanced 
capitalist, democratic welfare states’. ‘State corporatism’, on the other hand, is characterised by state 
bureaucratic domination, monopolistic political representation, ideologically exclusive executive 
authorities, and is associated with anti-liberal, authoritarian or mercantilist states. This latter form has 
been linked to the more authoritarian regimes of East Asia and Latin America. 
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13 In Singapore and Malaysia social security mechanisms and funds have been used for a variety of 
economic and political purposes other than simple social welfare, in ways that are central to 
maintaining the existing political order. See Asher (forthcoming). 
14 See Bagchi’s (2000) discussion of the history of developmental states, which argues that they have 
played a crucial role in underpinning the rise of most successful economies from medieval England to 
post-war Korea. 
15 On the Latin American experience and the increasing power of private sector capital, see Adelman 
(1998). 
16 See Bob Woodward’s (account of the constraining influence of the bond markets over Clinton’s 
public policy options. 
17 See Mastanduno (2000). 
18 It should also be noted here that the so-called ‘overseas Chinese’, or  the patterns of social relations 
associated with the 50 million or so ethnic Chinese who live outside mainland China have played an 
important part in this cross-border economic integration, as they have throughout Southeast Asia. 
Important as this social and economic phenomenon has clearly  been in East Asia, there are increasing 
doubts about its ability to retain its distinctive relationship-based (gaunxi) qualities, especially its links 
to centres of political power (Wai-chung Yeung 1999), and about its potential to reinforced ethnic 
stereotypes that may be becoming increasingly redundant in a global era (Dirlik 1997). 
19 The most influential examples of these sorts of teleological discourses are by Fukuyama (1992) in 
the political/social sphere, and Ohmae (1996) in an economic context. 
20 A production complex is defined as a relatively stable network of actors that meet regularly to 
exchange goods, technology, capital, information and/or people, and which allocate values. The 
significance of this formulation here is that production complexes are not necessarily tied to national 
frameworks. See Ruigrok and van Tulder (1995). 
21 One of the other major long-term factors that has characterised capitalist development generally, and 
which has helped determine the ways in which various countries and regions are incorporated into the 
global system has been a shift from ‘Fordist’, mass-production to more ‘flexible’ forms of 
manufacturing. See, Amin (1994). 
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